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Accountability for international human rights violations
is increasingly being sought in United States domestic courts.
The Alien Tort Statute (the "ATS")' has been used to hold
individuals and corporations, which are subject to personal
jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts, liable for their involvement
in human rights violations around the world. Traditionally,
the ATS has applied to human rights violations committed by
agents of foreign nations.' An interesting development in the
application of the statute is the recent effort by plaintiffs to
use the ATS to sue transnational corporations for violations of
international law in countries outside the United States.' As
private individuals and corporations continue to be sued, the
ATS could become a powerful tool to increase corporate
accountability for contributions to or involvement in
international violations of human rights.4
In holding corporations vicariously liable for their
involvement in violations of the law of nations, courts have
* Erin Stapp will earn her J.D. with a Certificate in International Law from
Santa Clara University in 2009. At Santa Clara, she is an Articles Editor for
the Santa Clara Law Review and an Emery Law Scholar. She wished to thank
Professor Beth Van Schaack for all of her support and help with this paper.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). This statute is also commonly referred to as
the Alien Tort Claims Act (the "ATCA").
2. See infra Part II.A-B.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. Global Policy Forum, Alien Tort Claims Act,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/atcaindx.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2008).
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been inconsistent in determining which legal standard
applies. Courts have turned to vicarious liability standards
found in international law, domestic law, and the law of the
situs. This inconsistency has led to unpredictability in what
standard will apply to individual or corporate defendants
when they are charged with violating the law of nations. This
choice of law problem could potentially result in various
notice or due process challenges, even when all of the other
elements of a claim are met.
This comment will focus on whether courts should apply
international law, domestic law, or the law of the situs to
determine the appropriate standard for third party liability in
the ATS.5 First, it will discuss early ATS practice, setting the
background for holding corporations liable under third-party
standards of liability.6 In recent years the trend has moved
from holding foreign individuals who come to the United
States liable for international violations they participated in
overseas, to holding corporations liable for their actions in
foreign states.7
Next, it will discuss Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the
landmark case in which the Supreme Court set the standard
for finding substantive norms cognizable under the ATS.8
The Court held that for a claim to be brought under the ATS,
it must be based on an international norm that is accepted by
the civilized world and is defined with "specificity."9 The
paper will then analyze the current issue of deciding what
legal standards apply to different forms of liability under the
ATS.' ° It will examine the different sources of law used to
5. See infra Parts IIA-B.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.B. Courts have held corporations liable through such
standards as complicity liability, aiding and abetting, and joint criminal
enterprise ("JCE"). Tarek F. Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity:
Alternative Forms of Accomplice Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 38
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 39, 39 (2005) ("[A]lternative forms of complicity-
primarily joint criminal enterprise, but also conspiracy, instigation, and
procurement-arising from the influential and growing jurisprudence of the
international criminal tribunals and comments briefly on their implications for
ATCA litigation against corporations. . .
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). Based on the
Court's interpretation of the statute in this case, courts are to apply substantive
international law to determine the appropriate subject matter in an ATS suit.
10. See infra Part III.
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determine third-party liability under the ATS, including
international law (to the extent that it can be ascertained
through customary international law, general principles, or
case law), United States federal law, and the law of the
situs." Finally, the paper concludes that United States
courts should apply international law where there is a
universally accepted and clearly defined international law
standard.12 In situations where such international standards
do not exist, courts should apply either U.S. federal standards
of liability or the standard applicable in the country where
the violation occurred. 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Alien Tort Statute History
Two statutes give United States federal courts
jurisdiction to hear claims for international law violations:
the 1789 Alien Torts Claims Act (commonly referred to as the
Alien Tort Statute, or ATS) 14 and the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (the "TVPA")."5 The ATS, part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789,16 grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over
any dispute where an alien sues "for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 7 The ATS enables foreigners to seek compensation
in the United States for violations of international law." The
TVPA lends additional support by providing aliens as well as
U.S. citizens a cause of action in federal courts for claims of
11. See infra Parts III.A-C.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part V. The determination of which standard to apply should
be based on the law that is the most established in order to ensure that the
defendant was on notice of liability for their actions.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
15. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). The first law establishing the Federal courts and
regulating their jurisdiction and procedure was enacted at the first session of
the First Congress. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice: Politics, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1421 (1989).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
18. See Human Rights Watch, Defend the Alien Tort Claims Act (July 29,
2003), http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/atca/.
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torture and extra-judicial killing.19 The TVPA reinforced the
legitimacy of litigation under the ATS and filled in some of
the holes that ATS cases had exposed.2 °
ATS and TVPA cases provide a U.S. forum for victims to
tell their stories to a court and to create a judicial record of
their suffering.21 Although damage awards under the ATS
and TVPA are hard to enforce, victims have increasingly been
able to recover. 22 This sends a message to others that such
conduct is unacceptable.23  Victims are empowered and
perpetrators are, in effect, barred from the United States for
fear of enforcement actions. These suits also allow U.S.
courts to articulate principles of international law that are
applicable in the United States and to contribute to the
international protection of human rights by providing a venue
for victims to seek justice.24
B. Alien Tort Statute Practice Pre-Sosa-Setting the Stage
for Corporate Liability
Although the ATS has been part of the United States
code since 1789, it went practically unused for almost 200
years. However, in the past thirty years, victims have used
the ATS to hold state actors, private actors, and corporations
liable for their involvement in violations of the law of nations
around the world. The first time the statute was activated, in
Filartiga v. Pran-Irala,5  the Second Circuit held that
deliberate torture, perpetrated under the color of official
authority, violates universally accepted norms of
international human rights law, and that such a violation of
19. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
20. May I Speak Freely? Media for Social Change, Fighting Impunity in
U.S. Courts (June 22, 2006),
http://www.mayispeakfreely.org/nodev/index.php?gSec=doc&docid=60.
21. See Francisco Rivera, Inter-American Justice: Now Available in a U.S.
Federal Court near You, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 889, 898 (2005).
22. See Human Rights Watch, Background on the Alien Tort Claims Act
(July 29, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/atca/intro.htm.
23. See id.
24. See Rivera, supra note 21, at 896-97.
25. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala involved a suit by relatives of a Paraguayan who was kidnapped and
tortured to death by the defendant, a Paraguayan police official. Id. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Alien Tort Claims Act allows
victims to sue in U.S. courts for serious violations of international human rights
law. Human Rights Watch, supra note 22.
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international law constitutes a violation of the domestic law
of the United States, giving rise to a claim under the ATS.26
After that decision, victims used the ATS from 1980-1996
primarily to sue foreign officials who are subject to United
States jurisdiction.27 Through litigation of ATS cases, U.S.
courts have recognized that a limited number of international
common law torts violate the law of nations. These include
genocide," crimes against humanity,29 war crimes,3° torture, 3
"disappearances, ' 2 extra-judicial executions, 3 and forced
labor and prolonged arbitrary detention. 4 Victims may now
bring claims for such abuses under the ATS
Traditionally, the defendants in ATS suits were foreign
26. Alien Tort Claims Act,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/torts3y/readings/update-a-02.html (last visited Oct.
14, 2008).
27. Paul Hoffman, Lecture at Santa Clara University: Litigating
International Labor Rights (November 1, 2007).
28. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("[Plersons may be susceptible to civil liability if
they commit either a crime traditionally warranting universal jurisdiction or an
offense that comparably violates current norms of international law. To identify
such crimes, I look for guidance to the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS (REVISED) § 702 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982), which
enumerates as violations of international law state-practiced, encouraged, or -
condoned (a) genocide ....").
29. See Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1144, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(finding that "both extrajudicial killings and crimes against humanity meet the
specific, universal obligatory standard," allowing them to be recognized as a
claim under the present day law of nations) ("The international prohibition of
crimes against humanity is explicitly codified in several multilateral
agreements and has been extensively litigated in international tribunals,
constituting a body of doctrinal exposition.").
30. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]e hold that
subject-matter jurisdiction exists, that Karadzic may be found liable for
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity and
for other violations in his capacity as a state actor, and that he is not immune
from service of process.").
31. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
("[Official torture constitutes a cognizable violation of the law of nations . . ").
32. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
("[The submitted materials are sufficient to establish the existence of a
universal and obligatory international proscription of the tort of 'causing
disappearance.' ").
33. See Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1144 ("[Tihe facts pleaded in the
Complaint establish Plaintiffs claims of extrajudicial killing in violation of the
TVPA and extrajudicial killing and crimes against humanity in violation of the
ATCA.").
34. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)
(determining that slave trade is cognizable under the ATS).
35. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 22.
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government officials or foreign state actors who committed
violations of international law while acting under the color of
law.36  However, the trend in U.S. courts is shifting. Now,
U.S. courts are holding private actors, such as foreign or U.S.
corporations, liable for violations of the law of nations under
the ATS.37  Victims have filed ATS suits against
multinational corporations accused of direct complicity in
crimes committed by foreign governments and their security
forces.38
Expanding on the precedent set by the Nuremberg
criminal tribunals after World War II, which held non-state
actors accountable for international human rights violations,
U.S. courts have held that corporations can be brought into
court under an ATS claim depending upon the nature of the
offense alleged.39  In several post-World War II cases, the
heads of German corporations who contributed to Nazi war
efforts were prosecuted for war crimes and crimes against
humanity.4" These were some of the first cases to hold
individuals responsible for violations of international law,
thus modifying the notion that the state is the sole actor
responsible for international law violations.4' These cases
revealed a willingness to "contemplate corporate
responsibility at the international level" by prominent legal
decision makers of the time.42
The Second Circuit utilized the same reasoning several
decades later in Kadic v. Karadzic,43 which extended ATS
liability for certain violations of international law to private
parties and individual actors.44 The court in Kadic held that
aspects of the law of nations could reach the conduct of
36. Francisco Rivera, A Response to the Corporate Campaign Against the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 251, 251-52 (2003).
37. Id.
38. Alien Tort Claims Act, supra note 26.
39. Id.
40. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of
Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 477-78 (2001) (noting that in "three
cases, United States v. Flick, United States v. Krauch (the I.G. Farben Case),
and United States v. Krupp, the leaders of large German industries were
prosecuted for crimes against peace (i.e., initiating World War II), war crimes,
and crimes against humanity").
41. See Rivera, supra note 36, at 254.
42. Ratner, supra note 40, at 477.
43. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
44. See id. at 239; Rivera, supra note 36.
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private parties, provided their conduct occurred under the
color of state authority or violated a norm of international law
that is recognized as extending to the conduct of private
parties.4 5  The Second Circuit concluded that Karadzic's
conduct violated well-established and universally recognized
norms of international law.46 The court specifically rejected
Karadzic's contention that Filartiga was distinguishable on
the basis that the law of nations was confined to state
action.4" Rather, the court held that "certain forms of conduct
violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting
under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals."4"
Examples of actionable private conduct the court cited
included participation in the slave trade and war crimes.49
The court's recognition of private liability for human rights
violations has been affirmed in later judicial opinions, ° the
opinion of the Executive Branch,51 and the Restatement of
45. Alien Tort Claims Act, supra note 26.
46. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242. The Plaintiffs in this case allege in their
complaint that
they are victims, and representatives of victims, of various atrocities,
including brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation,
torture, and summary execution, carried out by Bosnian-Serb military
forces as part of a genocidal campaign conducted in the course of the
Bosnian civil war. Karadic, formerly a citizen of Yugoslavia and now a
citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the President of a three-man
presidency of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic within Bosnia-
Herzegovina, sometimes referred to as "Srpska," which claims to
exercise lawful authority, and does in fact exercise actual control, over
large parts of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his capacity as
President, Karadzic possesses ultimate command authority over the
Bosnian-Serb military forces, and the injuries perpetrated upon
plaintiffs were committed as part of a pattern of systematic human
rights violations that was directed by Kardzic and carried out by the
military forces under his command. The complaints allege that
Karadzic acted in an official capacity either as the titular head of
Srpska or in collaboration with the government of the recognized




48. Id. at 239.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (concluding that there exists a "handful of
crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility").
51. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40 ("The Executive Branch has emphatically
restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be found liable
under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of
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Foreign Relations Law.52 Taken together, these sources
established liability of private non-state actors for offenses of
"universal concern."53
The court in Kadic extended the number of potential
defendants over which courts have jurisdiction in ATS claims
by enabling courts to hold private actors and multinational
corporations liable for violations committed while overseas.54
This is particularly significant for corporate defendants
because the decision established the opportunity for victims
to sue private parties responsible for or contributing to the
violations of the law of nations.55 In these cases, the key issue
is whether the company was engaged in an activity where it
could be found vicariously liable for the international
violation. 6 This can be established by showing elements of
knowledge, practical support, or encouragement to the agent
carrying out the action that constitutes a cognizable violation
of the law of nations. 7 Violations in corporate cases are
based on vicarious liability because state agents outside the
scope of U.S. personal jurisdiction are the real malefactors.
Courts have used a combination of federal common law
standards and standards set out in international tribunals to
establish the aiding and abetting standard utilized to hold
corporations liable and achieve justice in U.S. courts.5"
international humanitarian law.").
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)'OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1986) (stating in relevant part that "[a] state has jurisdiction to
define and prescribe punishment for certain offense recognized by the
community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism").
53. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240.
54. See id.
55. See Alexandra Arriaga, Congressional Human Rights Caucus Corporate
Social Responsibility: Human Rights and Transnational Companies, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA, Nov. 22, 2004,
http://www.amnestyusa.orgbusiness/csr.html.
56. Hoffman, supra note 27.
57. Id. ("aiding and abetting" standard used in the Nuremburg cases was
used to prove that a company was an active participant in the human rights
violation).
58. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, % 235 (Dec. 10,
1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgement/fur-
tj981210e.pdf ("The Trial Chamber [of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)] holds that the actus reus of aiding and abetting
in international criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or
502 [Vo1:49
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Further expanding the potential to find corporations
liable under the ATS, cases following Kadic have extended
the reasoning behind finding private actors liable.59 Recent
decisions have held that corporations may be liable under the
TVPA, in addition to the ATS.6° The significance of holding
corporations liable under the TVPA is that it reinforces the
validity of holding similar corporate action accountable under
solely the ATS. The courts' reasoning is that private
corporations are essentially "persons" under the law and
therefore do not have immunity under domestic or
international law.61
Support of the United States and many U.S. corporations
has strengthened the legitimacy of holding corporations liable
under the ATS. 62 For example, corporations have voluntarily
signed codes of conduct or similar initiatives, making it clear
that "corporate interests are not incompatible with human
rights concerns." 63  Because of the courts' expansion of
corporate liability under the ATS, there has been an increase
in corporate ATS lawsuits.64 This has given rise to the issue
of what standard of liability is applicable to hold corporations
vicariously liable for their actions. Doe I v. Unocal Corp. ,65 a
moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime.")).
59. See id. at 946 (noting that a private company utilizing slave labor may
be subject to liability under the ATS); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No.
96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
60. See Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1263
(holding that the TVPA applies to corporations); Rivera, supra note 36, at 254
n.20 (citing Sinaltrainal v. Coca Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla.
2003) ("Bearing in mind that a corporation is generally viewed the same as a
person in other areas of law, it is reasonable to conclude that had Congress
intended to exclude corporations from liability under the TVPA, it could and
would have expressly stated so.")).
61. See Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private
Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 803 (2002).
62. Rivera, supra note 36, at 262.
63. Id. ("In fact, these voluntary initiatives cover a much broader range of
rights than the few fundamental human rights covered under the ATS.").
64. See id. at 254 n.22 ("[O]n April 24, 2003, a suit was filed against
Occidental Petroleum and its security contractor, Airscan, Inc., for their role in
the murder of innocent civilians in the hamlet of Santo Domingo, Colombia on
December 13, 1998. On April 5, 2003, attorney Ed Fagan filed a 6.1 billion
dollar lawsuit in New York and Nevada on behalf of former workers of the
diamond companies Anglo American and De Beers, alleging that the former
workers were wrongly fired for labor strikes, subjected to forced labor, and were
attacked, imprisoned, and tortured during labor protests.") (citations omitted).
65. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Ninth Circuit case based on the ATS, provides a discussion on
the appropriate choice of law to determine the standard for
aiding and abetting with the majority advocating the use of
international law and a concurring judge arguing for the use
of federal common law standards.66 Subsequent cases have
further explored and expanded upon the applicability of the
ATS to actions engaged in by corporations. Courts must
now decide whether they should apply international law,
domestic common law, or the law of the situs, to determine
the appropriate standard for third party liability in such
cases.
68
C. Defining the Cognizable Alien Tort Statute Claim in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machian
Until 2004, there was not a clear explanation or
interpretation of what constituted a violation of the law of
nations and, therefore, what constituted a cognizable claim
under the ATS. However, in its most recent decision
interpreting the ATS, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the U.S.
Supreme Court set the standard for finding substantive
norms cognizable under the ATS.69 The Court stated that, "at
the time of enactment, the jurisdiction enables federal courts
to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of
nations and recognized at common law." °
According to the Court, the law of nations at the time the
ATS was enacted was comprised of two elements71 : general
norms of how nations behaved and interacted with one
another, 2 and "as a body of judge-made law regulating the
conduct of individuals situated outside domestic boundaries
66. See infra Part IV.A-B.
67. See Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1263
(N.D. Ala. 2003) (holding that violation to right of association is actionable
under the ATCA); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Given [that] private individuals are liable
for violations of international law in certain circumstances, there is no logical
reason why corporations should not be held liable, at least in cases of jus cogens
violations.").
68. See infra Part III.
69. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
70. Id.
71. Id.




and consequently carrying an international savor."73  The
Court looked to the time period before the passing of the ATS
to analyze Congress's efforts to address the law of nations in
U.S. courts." Ultimately, it decided that the ATS is more
than a strictly jurisdictional statute.75 The Court determined
that, in 1789, few torts in violation of the law of nations were
understood to be within the common law, and, thus, they
were unable to claim these torts under the ATS. 76  At the
time, the statute was understood to be enacted on the belief
that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
international law violations with a potential for personal
liability.77
The Sosa Court recognized the strong argument that
judicial caution should be exercised when considering
individual claims raised under the ATS.7s Because these
claims are based on international common law, there is a
potential for judges to exercise judicial activism, which is
what the Court is cautioning. Common law has changed from
what it was when the statute was originally implemented to
what it is now.7' Today, "there is a general understanding
that the law is not so much found or discovered as it is either
made or created.""° The jurisdictional grant was originally
understood to apply to the enforcement of a small number of
international norms that a federal court could properly
recognize as within the common law.81 In this vein, the Sosa
Court limited the subject matter covered by the ATS by
73. Id. at 715.
74. Id. at 716.
75. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719-20 (2004) ("[Tlhe First
Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on
the shelf for use be a future Congress or state legislature that might, someday,
authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some element
of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners.... [A]dditionally,
Congress intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of
actions alleging violations of the law of nations.").
76. Id. at 720.
77. Id. at 724.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 725 ("[Wle now tend to understand common law not as a
discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a
product of human choice. And we now adhere to a conception of limited judicial
power first expressed in reorienting federal diversity jurisdiction (Erie), that
federal courts have no authority to derive 'general' common law.").
81. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004).
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requiring "any claim based on the present day law of nations
to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized."2
The Court recognized that a "narrow class of
international norms" provide for causes of action under the
ATS today. 3 The Supreme Court has affirmed that domestic
law of the United States does, in fact, recognize the law of
nations.' As further support for the legitimacy of the subject
matter carved out by federal courts deciding ATS cases, the
Court noted that Congress has not disagreed with this
interpretation. 5 In fact, Congress has enacted legislation,
such as the TVPA, 6 to aid in enforcing ATS judgments
decided in federal courts.8 '
The Court ultimately decided that "federal courts should
not recognize private claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms familiar when [ATS] was enacted."8 8
The determination of whether a norm is sufficiently definite
to support a cause of action should involve taking into
consideration the practical consequences of making that
cause available to litigants in the federal courts.8 9
The Court has recognized various sources of international
law.90 Absent a treaty, controlling executive or legislative act,
or judicial decision, it is appropriate to apply the customs and
usages of civilized nations. 91 Additionally, "courts recognize
the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor,
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly
well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat as a
82. Id. at 725.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 729-30 (citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630 (1981) (recognizing that "international disputes implicating... our
relations with foreign nations" are one of the "narrow areas" in which "federal
common law" continues to exist)).
85. Id. at 730-31.
86. See supra Part II.A.
87. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004).
88. Id. at 732-33.
89. Id.




legitimate source of international law."9 2 Judicial tribunals
resort to such works, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of that the law really is. 9
3
Therefore to bring a claim, the plaintiff needs to allege a
violation of a "norm of customary international law so well
defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy."94
Sosa resolved the issue of what constitutes a cognizable
threshold claim under ATS, determining that international
law is applicable.9 However, the decision in Sosa left open
the question of which body of law determines ancillary issues
such as the source for standards of third-party liability.
Should courts also look to international law and, if there is
not a universally accepted, clearly defined standard of
liability, should courts determine that there is no claim to be
raised? Or, should courts simply apply the standards
applicable in U.S. federal suits that they have expertise in
applying?
D. Holding Corporations Liable in Unocal
The Ninth Circuit case, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., provided a
discussion about the applicable choice of law under the ATS
with respect to the complicity standard to hold a corporation
liable.96 The majority looked at international criminal law
jurisprudence to determine the standard required to establish
third-party liability for a violation of the law of nations.97 In
1992, Unocal began participating in a joint venture in
Myanmar to extract natural gas and to create a pipeline to
transport the gas through Myanmar. 8  The Myanmar
military aided the project by providing several battalions of
soldiers for security, building helipads, and clearing roads
along the proposed pipeline route.99 There is evidence that
92. Id.
93. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (quoting The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
94. Id. at 738.
95. Id. at 692.
96. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947-53 (9th Cir. 2002).
97. See Id. at 937 (looking to the aiding and abetting standard described in
decisions of the international criminal tribunals of Rwanda (ICTR) and
Yugoslavia (ICTY)).
98. Id. at 937.
99. Id. at 937-38.
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Unocal was notified by several sources that the Myanmar
military was engaged in forced labor, murder, rape, and other
human rights violations while they were supporting Unocal's
project. 00 Despite this knowledge, Unocal continued to work
on and operate the pipeline, all the while accepting support
from the Myanmar military.'01 In 1996, plaintiffs filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California,
claiming that Unocal and the Myanmar Military had violated
the ATS.'0 ' The court dismissed the claims against the
Myanmar Military and a Myanmar-owned oil company
because they were protected under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act. 0 3  However, the court allowed the claim
against Unocal to proceed.10 4
The Ninth Circuit remanded, but held that Unocal could
be held liable for its complicity in human rights violations
that were committed by the Myanmar military.'015 The court
found that the "plaintiffs had presented evidence that Unocal
knowingly provided assistance to the military in its
commission of forced labor, murder, and rape."0 6
The court first decided that the plaintiffs had established
the requisite subject matter jurisdiction hurdle by claiming a
tort that is cognizable under the ATS.' °7 It then addressed
the question arising in almost every ATS case against a
corporation or private actor, of whether the alleged tort
requires the private party to engage in state action, and if so,
whether the private party in fact engaged in such state
action. 10  The court concluded that there are some situations,
like the one in Unocal, in which state action is not required.'0 9
100. Id. at 939-40.
101. Id.
102. Doe I v. Unocal Corp, 395 F.3d 932, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2002).
103. Id. at 943-44.
104. Id.
105. Rivera, supra note 36, at 252.
106. Id.
107. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 945.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 944-46 ("There are a 'handful of crimes,' including slave trading,
'to which the law of nations attributes individual liability,' such that state
action is not required. . .. [A]lthough 'acts of rape, torture, and summary
execution,' like most crimes, 'are proscribed by international law only when
committed by state officials or under color of law' to the extent that they were
committed in isolation, these crimes 'are actionable under the Alien Tort
[Claims] Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that they were
committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes.' ").
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Since state action was not required, the court went on to
discuss the applicable standard for aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS." °  The court determined that it
should apply international law as developed in decisions by
international criminal tribunals, such as the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals, to determine the applicable substantive
law.11
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Throughout post-Sosa litigation, courts have continued to
hold private individuals and corporations personally liable
under the ATS through standards such as command
responsibility or aiding and abetting.112 The ATS, however, is
ambiguous as to how courts should handle the intricacies that
arise throughout the course of litigation, including how the
alleged tort should be evaluated and litigated in a federal
district court once a party meets the jurisdictional
requirement of stating a claim under the law of nations.11 3
Judicial interpretation of the ATS has been complicated by
the complete absence of legislative history."4 The ATS is not
110. See id. at 947-49.
111. See id. at 948 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir.
1980)) ("The law of nations 'may be ascertained by consulting the works of
jurists, writing professedly on public law' or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.' ").
112. See Barrueto v. Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 2005)
(upholding a jury instruction stating that the defendant could be held liable for
aiding and abetting torture and extrajudicial killing if he "substantially assisted
some person or persons who personally committed or caused the wrongful acts"
and "knew that his actions would assist in the legal or wrongful activity at the
time he provided the assistance"); see also Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp 2d 1112
(E.D. Cal. 2004) (looking to a pre-Sosa decision to determine that a defendant
can be liable for aiding and abetting under the ATS).
113. Civil Procedure-Choice of Law-Ninth Circuit Uses International Law
to Decide Applicable Substantive Law Alien Tort Claims Act, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1525, 1527 (2003).
114. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The debates that
led to the Act's passage contain no reference to the Alien Tort Statute, and there
is no direct evidence of what the First Congress intended it to accomplish.");
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Despite the fact that the ATCA has existed for over two
hundred years, little is known of the framers' intentions in adopting it-the
legislative history of the Judiciary Act does not refer to Section 1350.")); Lucien
J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Modern Transnational Enterprise:
Deconstructing the Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INTL L. 3, 10 n.28
(2003) (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.10 (2d
Cir. 2000) ("The original purposes of the ATCA remain the subject of some
510 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:49
mentioned in the debates surrounding the adoption of the
first Judiciary Act," 5 and there is no evidence of what its
drafters intended by its inclusion."6  In addition to lack of
legislative history, there is also speculation on the legislative
intent of the drafters." 7  Interpreting the ATS in modern
times is complicated even further by the lack of any
substantial judicial precedent until the 1980s." s
Although Sosa addressed and answered the debate
regarding the cognizable threshold question, there is still
debate about what choice of law should apply when the courts
are faced with determining whether or not to apply various
forms of vicarious liability." 9  This is the issue with which
courts are faced when hearing an ATS claim against
corporations. The success of claims under the ATS against a
corporation depends on (1) whether the offense is universally
controversy . . . [since] [t]he Act has no formal legislative history. . . . [The
intent of the original legislators . . . is forever hidden from our view by the
scarcity of relevant evidence .... ").
115. See Dhooge,'supra note 114, at 10 n.29.
116. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (stating that, the debates over the Judiciary Act in
the House and Senate do not mention the ATS provisions).
117. Dhooge, supra note 114, at 11 ("Some postulate that it was related to
national security and sovereign considerations. These commentators have
concluded that the ATS was intended to shield the United States from foreign
threats resulting from erroneous interpretations of international law by the
states, protect the physical integrity of foreign ambassadors serving in the
United States, prevent piracy, and serve as a 'badge of honor' signifying the
arrival of the United States in the community of nations. Other commentators
have focused upon economic realities [arguing that] the ATS was intended to
bolster the economy by encouraging immigration and foreign investment
through the assurance that the United States would conduct itself in accordance
with the law of nations.").
118. See id. at 12-13 (citing O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51
(1908) (suggesting in passing that the ATCA may be applicable to a claim that a
U.S. officer illegally seized alien property in a foreign state.)); Nguyen Da Yen v.
Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting in dicta that injuries
accruing as a result of the evacuation could be addressed pursuant to the
ATCA); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-65 (D. Md. 1961) (holding that
wrongful withholding of custody constituted an actionable tort, and the misuse
of a passport to gain the child's entry into the United States was a violation of
international law); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607)
(concluding that the ATCA granted jurisdiction with respect to a dispute
concerning title to slaves seized on a captured enemy vessel).
119. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (advocating for
the use of international law standards); Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J. concurring)
(arguing for the application of domestic federal law).
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condemned and well-defined,120 (2) whether the offense
requires the plaintiff to establish state action, and (3)
whether the corporation as a private actor can be held liable
for acts of the state or other parties under theories of third-
party liability. 121
Once a plaintiff bringing an ATS claim against a
corporation claims a universally condemned and definable
offense, the plaintiff must also show that the alleged violation
is actionable against private parties without a showing of
state action.122 Or, if state action is required, that the action
of the defendant was sufficiently linked with state action to
form a basis for the claim.'23 Thus far, courts have held only
four violations of the law of nations as actionable without
state action: genocide, 24 war crimes,125 forced labor or
slavery, 26 and crimes against humanity. 27  Additional
violations, including torture, rape, and summary execution,
are only actionable without a showing of state action when
perpetrated in the context of genocide, war crimes, forced
labor or slavery, and crimes against humanity. 28  If the
alleged violation requires a showing of state action, U.S.
courts have used the joint action test,1 29 the nexus test,130
120. This is the standard set out in Sosa. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692 (2004); see supra Part II.C.
121. Rivera, supra note 36, at 269.
122. Id. at 272.
123. Id.
124. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 232 (1995); see also Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 363, 370 (E.D. La. 1997).
125. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232.
126. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 932 (2002).
127. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232; see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
128. See Rivera, supra note 36, at 273 n.l0. ("In Wiwa, the Southern
District of NY discussed when state action would be necessary for claims of
crimes against humanity, and found that Kadic did not foreclose the possibility
that other violations, when committed within the context of crimes against
humanity, do not require state action. Further, according to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, certain violations could constitute crimes
against humanity, thus eliminating the state action requirement, if committed
'as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack.'") (citations omitted).
129. See id. at 273 ("Under the joint action test, a plaintiff must show that a
state actor was a willful participant acting jointly or in concert with the actors
of the deprivation of rights .... Under this test, state acquiescence or approval
of the deprivation of rights is probably not enough to establish the state actor
requirement. The State actor must have participated, influenced or played an
integral part in the conduct.").
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and/or the symbiotic relationship test to determine whether
the plaintiff can bring the claim. 131  Meeting these
requirements establishes that the named defendant is an
acceptable defendant for an ATS case.
Once it is determined that a corporation or private
individual is an acceptable defendant under the ATS, courts
determine the applicable standard for different sources of
third-party liability, such as conspiracy, complicity, or aiding
and abetting.1 32 In the Unocal case, Judge Reinhardt argued
in his concurring opinion that the courts must decide whether
international law or federal common law is applicable for the
various standards of liability and ancillary questions that
arise throughout the course of litigating an ATS claim.1 33 He
emphasized that the choice of law "does not depend on the
facts of the particular case, nor does it vary with the
particular circumstances of the case."134 Thus, he believed
that a controlling legal principle must govern the legal
questions involved, regardless of the particular facts of a
case. 135
Ultimately, the choice of law determination that courts
are faced with is whether U.S. federal courts should apply
international law, the law of situs, or U.S. domestic standards
of liability to the ancillary claims made against corporations
or private individuals. Although the defendants typically
come to the United States and are thus bound by U.S. laws
while here, should they be bound by U.S. standards of
liability for acts unrelated to the United States? If so, should
130. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1980)
(applying the nexus test and emphasizing that the key inquiry nonetheless
must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
fairly treated as that of the state itself).
131. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (application of joint action test); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-
Cola Co., 256 F. Supp 2d 1345, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (explaining that a
symbiotic relationship existed when two partied confer benefits on each other
such that their interdependence is essential to the other's success); see also
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 363, 370 (E.D. La. 1997)
(giving a discussion of the various tests to meet the requirement of state action).
132. See Maassarani, supra note 7, at 39.
133. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 968 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id. ("What varies from case to case is not the question of governing law,
but whether liability attaches in the particular instance.").
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this occur in all situations, or only limited situations? Is it
more persuasive to apply domestic federal law when U.S.
corporations are involved? Should we apply international
standards when there are universal, definite standards of
liability?
These are all questions the courts must weigh when
determining which standard of liability to apply when
assessing the defendant's action. To make this determination
courts have turned to domestic law, general principles of
international law or the law of the situs to determine whether
the defendant is liable under third-party liability.'36 This
lack of consistency leads to confusion as well as potential
notice and due process issues. The next section will analyze




International law must provide a "clear and
unambiguous" right to support an ATS claim. 137  There are
four primary sources for establishing international law:
international conventions and treaties establishing expressly
recognized rules, 38 customary international law,139 judicial
decisions, 4 ° and works of "highly qualified" legal scholars.'
136. Paul E. Hagen et al., The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Primer on Liability
for Multinational Corporations, SJ059 ALI-ABA 319, 326 (2004).
137. See id. at 324.
138. Nathaniel Burney, International Law: A BriefPrimer for Informational
Purposes Only (2007),
http://www.burneylawfirm.com/international law..primer.htm (Treaties are
"international agreements [that] are governed, not by contract law, but by the
Vienna Convention on Treaty Law. Under it, states can do anything they want
to agree to, unless it violates a peremptory norm.").
139. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
customary international law is something done as a general practice-not
because it is expedient or convenient, but because it is considered law, out of a
sense of legal requirement); Hagen, supra note 136, at 323 (stating that
customary international law is established by the custom or practice of states,
evidenced by formal lawmaking and official actions of states, acting out of legal
obligation).
140. For example, courts have utilized decisions by the International
Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to determine applicable international law. See Doe
I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice I defines these sources of international law. These
are the places that U.S. courts have turned to when they have
elected to apply international law standards of third-party
liability in ATS suits.
Analysis of the Unocal case highlights the issues the
court faces when applying vicarious liability standards and
how the court has dealt with these issues. The court
explained that, throughout the history of ATS cases, courts
have applied international law, the law of the state where the
underlying events occurred, or the law of the forum state.
The court further stated that when jus cogens141 violations are
alleged, it may be preferable to apply international law rather
than the law of any particular state.146 The reasoning behind
this proposition was that the law of any particular state is
141. See Hagen, supra note 136, at 323.
142. See U.N. Charter ch. II art. 38, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=O (stating to first, look to
international conventions and other treaties, second, look to customary
international law as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, third, look
to general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and fourth, look to
subsidiary determinations of law, such as, judicial decisions and works of highly
qualified legal scholars).
143. See Burney, supra note 138.
144. See generally Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla.
2002) (concluding, on the basis of the statute of and a decision by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, that defendants
"may be held liable under the ATS for ... aiding and abetting the actions taken
by military officials"); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (noting that among "various contemporary sources" for ascertaining the
norms of international law as they pertain to the ATS, "the statutes of the
[International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and recent opinions of these
tribunals are particularly relevant"); Burney, supra note 138, at 950 (finding
"recent decisions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda especially
helpful for ascertaining the current standard for aiding and abetting under
international law as it pertains to the ATS").
145. "A mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law accepted
and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (abr. 8th ed. 2005).
146. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Because
'the law of nations is part of federal common law,' the choice between
international law and the law of the forum state . . . is less crucial than the
choice between international law and the law of the state in which the
underlying events occurred. . . . [Tihe standard for aiding and abetting in
international criminal law is similar to the standard for aiding and abetting in
domestic tort law, making the choice between international and domestic law
even less crucial.").
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either identical to the jus cogens norm of international law, or
it is invalid. 147
The Unocal court supported its determination that
international law should apply, by citing the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws section six."4 The court argued
that first, "the needs of the . . . international system" are
better served by applying international rather than national
law.149 Second, "the relevant policies of the forum" cannot be
ascertained by referring to one out-of-circuit decision which
happens to favor federal common law and ignoring other
decisions which have favored other law, including
international law.15° Third, regarding "the protections of
justified expectations," the "certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result," and the "ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied," the standard adopted by
the majority, although from a recent case, is actually
grounded in the Nuremburg trials and is similar to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.' Finally, "the basic policy
underlying the particular field of law" is to provide tort
remedies for violations of international law.152
The court limited its holding to the proposition that
application of international law is appropriate to the facts of
this particular case. It stated that, "in other cases with
different facts, application of the law of the forum state-
including federal common law-or the law of the state where
the events occurred may be appropriate."15 3  The court
explained that international law should determine the
"applicable substantive law" to govern whether Unocal bore
third-party liability under ATS.'5 ' The court reasoned that
using international law better served the needs of the
international system and ultimately fulfilled the ATS's
purpose of "provid[ing] tort remedies for violations of
147. Id.
148. Id. at 949. Support for the application of international law over the law
of the state in which the underlying events occurred or U.S. domestic common
law is found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
149. Id.
150. Id.; see Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.12 (2d
Cir. 2000).
151. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 949 n.25.
154. Id. at 949.
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international law. 155
There is additional support for the Ninth Circuit's
determination that use of international law is appropriate to
determine the standard of third party liability. In the Sosa
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, foreign governments and
the European Commission filed amicus curiae briefs in
support of applying international law.156 In these briefs, the
European Commission called for U.S. courts to "rigorously
apply international law" both "to determine the conduct that
gives rise to a violation of the law of nations" and "to
determine the actors who may be subject to liability."157 The
U.S. tried to argue that no cause of action could be inferred
from customary international law norms unless such norms
had been affirmatively adopted and made enforceable by the
political branches of the United States.158 In its opinion, the
Supreme Court rejected the United State's position that only
customary international law norms adopted and made
enforceable by the political branches could serve as the basis
for such causes of action. 59 This leaves open the possibility
that the Supreme Court will embrace the reasoning of the
majority in Unocal to apply international law to determine
the standard of third-party liability.
In the context of international law, there are five
different theories of third party liability that are arguably
clearly defined and universally accepted enough to be argued
in an ATS case in federal court: aiding and abetting, joint
criminal enterprise, conspiracy, instigation, and procurement.
1. Aiding and Abetting
The Ninth Circuit case, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., provides
discussion about the applicable choice of law with respect to
the aiding and abetting standard under ATS. 6° The majority
looked at international criminal law jurisprudence to
determine the standard required to establish third-party
liability based on a charge of aiding and abetting a violation
155. Id.
156. Brief for Neither Party as Amicus Curiae of the European Commission
Supporting Neither Party, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No.
03-339), 2004 WL 177036.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
160. Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 947-53 (9th Cir. 2002).
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of the law of nations.161 The majority in Unocal utilized the
international standard of aiding and abetting16 2 established
by the ICTR and ICTY, as an argument for finding Unocal
liable for the human rights violations that occurred. 63 The
international crime of aiding and abetting is defined as:
"knowing and practical assistance or encouragement that has
a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime."164 The
importance of using international standards such as aiding
and abetting is that such complicity standards allow plaintiffs
to "hold a corporation directly liable as an accomplice in
crime, not just vicariously liable through a principle-agent
relationship with the tortfeasor" (which is typically the case
when applying U.S. domestic standards of liability). 165
Finding a corporation liable under the international standard
of aiding and abetting is "the same as being culpable of
knowingly 'supplying the killer with a gun,' as these
companies are providing the funds, equipment, directives,
logistics, and motivation to carry out rape, murder, forced
labor, and other abuses." 66
2. Joint Criminal Enterprise
Courts could apply the standard for joint criminal
enterprise ("JCE") that was discussed in the ICTY case,
Presecutor v. Tadic.'67 The Tadic decision discussed three
categories of liability for JCE. The first, referred to as
161. See Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 937 (looking to the aiding and abetting
standard described in decisions of the international criminal tribunals of
Rwanda (ICTR) and Yugoslavia (ICTY)).
162. "Aiding and abetting liability allows plaintiffs to hold a corporation
directly liable as an accomplice in crime, not just vicariously liable through a
principle-agent relationship with the tortfeasor." Maassarani, supra note 7, at
44.
163. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 949-50.
164. Id. at 947.
165. See Maassarani, supra note 7, at 44-45.
166. See id. at 45.
167. See Maassarani, supra note 7, at 52 (describing the "new form of joint
criminal enterprise ("JCE") accomplice liability that was based on the
understanding that criminal liability limited to the material perpetrator
improperly denies criminal liability of the co-perpetrator, while accomplice
liability still 'understate[s] the degree of their criminal responsibility' ")
(citations omitted). The majority in Unocal. utilized the international standard
of aiding and abetting established by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (the "ICTR") and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (the "ICTY"), as an argument for finding Unocal liable for the
human rights violations that occurred. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 949-50.
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collective liability, "is represented by cases where all co-
defendants, acting pursuant to a common design, possess the
same criminal intention. 168 The second category, referred to
as the "concentration camp" cases, applies when "the offences
charged were alleged to have been committed by members of
military or administrative units" thus linking them by nature
of their authoritative positions.' 69  The final category
"concerns cases involving a common design to pursue one
course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an
act which, while outside the common design, was
nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
effecting of that common purpose."170
The Appeals Chamber then outlined the actus reas and
mens rea elements for each JCE category. There must be a
common plan, design, or purpose that amounts to or involves
the commission of a crime. 17' However, it is not necessary
that the plan, design, or purpose have been previously
arranged or formulated. 172 The common plan or purpose may
materialize extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact
that a purity of persons acts in unison to put into effect a joint
criminal enterprise. 73  The requisite participation need not
involve commission of a specific crime, but may take the form
of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the
common plan or purpose. 174  This is most likely where
corporations will be found to be liable as participating in the
JCE.
As for the requisite mens rea element, in the "co-
perpetrator" class, shared intent to perpetrate the alleged
crime, or a common state of mind must be shown. 75 In the
168. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, IT 196-200 (July
15, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-
aj990715e.pdf. Collective liability is proven by showing "the formulation of a
plan among the co-perpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common design,
(and even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role within it), they
nevertheless all possess the intent to kill." Id.
169. Id. 91 202-03.
170. Id. I 204-19.
171. Id. 9191 210-12.
172. Id. 'fl 210-14.
173. Id. 1 221.
174. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 1 227 (July 15,
1999), available at http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-
aj990715e.pdf.
175. Id. 1IT 220, 228.
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"concentration camp" scenario, personal knowledge of the
system of ill treatment, as well as the intent to further this
common concerted system of ill-treatment is required.'76 In
the "unintended crime" situation, responsibility for a crime
outside the scope of that agreed upon in the common plan
arises when, "under the circumstances of the case (i) it was
foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or
other members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took
that risk."1 77
In its opinion, the Appeals Chamber demonstrated that
JCE is well established and distinct from aiding and abetting
under international law.'18  Furthermore, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld'79 the ICTY's JCE theory of liability was cited
favorably by a plurality of the Supreme Court's Justices.8 0
Additionally, the Southern District of Florida has utilized
JCE, emphasizing that such form of accomplice liability is
well established in customary international law.' 8 ' Therefore,
it appears that the international standard of JCE laid out in
the Tadic case is widely accepted and defined with enough
specificity to be a potential standard utilized in U.S. federal
courts.
3. Conspiracy
In addition to JCE, there is an international standard to
determine conspiracy to which courts could turn during the
course of an ATS litigation. The accepted international
standard for conspiracy can be found in the Nuremburg
statute: " 'Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices
participating in the formulation or execution of a common
plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution
of such plan.' ""82 The international standard for conspiracy
176. Id. T 220.
177. Id. T 228.
178. See id. Tadic essentially laid out three categories of liability. Id.
179. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 577, 611 n.40 (2006).
180. See Maassarani, supra note 7, at 57.
181. Id. (citing Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla.
2002)).
182. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 75 n.
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has also been upheld "as a well established principle of
international customary law by at least two U.S. District
Courts. 183  Conspiracy is distinguishable from the JCE
standard of liability because in conspiracy there is a requisite
showing that the activities were committed in furtherance of
the common purpose. 184  In addition, section 876 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides analogous civil
liability under domestic law for "a tortious act [done] in
concert with [another] or pursuant to a common design . ..
*"185 Since this standard is found in both widely recognized
international law and in U.S. domestic law, corporations
should take this potential liability into consideration when
doing business abroad.
4. Instigation
The international standard for instigation has been most
extensively utilized by the ICTR, usually in cases that deal
with vocal incitement to genocide and instigation of crowds to
violence.186 In the Akayesu case, the ICTR held
a defendant-though not a participant in the crime-
liable for instigation with the direct or specific intent to do
so, he or she prompts another to commit an offence, which
is then committed "through gifts, promises, threats, abuse
of authority or power, machinations or culpable artifice,"
as well as omissions when there exists a clear duty to
act.1
8 7
The plaintiff must show that the instigation was a "clear
contributing factor" to the perpetration of the crime, but it
need not be that "the crime would not have occurred without
the accused's involvement."18 8 The applicability of instigation
183. Maassarani, supra note 7, at 58-59 (citing Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding that ATCA suits may proceed based on theories of conspiracy and
aiding and abetting); Barrueto, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 1333; Eastman Kodak, Co. v.
Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("[T]he Court believes that it
would be a strange tort system the imposed liability on state actors but not on
those who conspired with them to perpetrate illegal acts through coercive use of
state power.")).
184. Id. at 57.
185. Id. at 60.
186. Id. at 61 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, 482, 536 (Sept. 2, 1998)).
187. Id. at 61.
188. Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and
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has been limited mainly to the genocide situation in Rwanda.
Liability for instigation is also recognized by U.S. tort law:
[F]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he ...
knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself [or if he] induces the
conduct, if he knows or should know of circumstances that
would make the conduct tortious if it were his own .. 189
5. Procurement
Courts can also look to the ICTR's decisions to determine
the standard for procurement.19 ° This standard was applied
in the Unocal and Talisman'9' cases, where "the corporation
provided the host government with funding, facilities, or
equipment to secure its operations, all the while fully
cognizant of the fact that it would go towards human rights
abuses as forced labor, torture, and extrajudicial killing. "192
Thus, there are various standards clearly laid out in
international law that U.S domestic courts could apply to
determine accomplice liability in ATS claims where
corporations are named as the defendant.
B. Federal Common Law
Some jurists believe that courts should not be applying
international standards, but should apply domestic standards
of third-party liability when confronted with the issue in ATS
suits. 193 Justice Reinhardt, concurring in the Unocal decision,
agreed with the result of the case, but rejected the majority's
application of international criminal law standards of third-
party liability.' He instead urged for application of federal
Opinion, 9 168 (Dec. 5, 2003)).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 876-77 (1979).
190. See Maassarani, supra note 7, at 62 (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 482, 536 (Sept. 2, 1998) ("The provision of
'weapons, instruments or any other means to be used in the commission of an
offence, with the full knowledge that they would be used for such purposes' is
commonly known as procurement.")).
191. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
192. See Maassarani, supra note 7, at 63-64.
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common law tort principles such as agency, joint venture, and
recklessness liability. 195
Judge Reinhardt claimed that the court should "look to
traditional civil tort principles embodied in federal common
law, rather than to evolving standards of international law,
such as a nascent criminal law doctrine recently adopted by
an ad hoc international criminal tribunal."196  He further
claimed that the text of the statute made it clear that
international law applies when determining whether a
violation of the law of nations has occurred. 197  However,
according to Judge Reinhardt, there was no indication from
the language of the ATS which body of law should apply to
ancillary issues that may arise.1 9 Looking at federal common
law, Judge Reinhardt commented that, although federal
courts only apply federal common law in limited
circumstances, "international relations constitute one
category of cases in which federal common law is frequently
applied."1 99 Judge Reinhardt concludes that, since ATS cases
involve the violation of international law, they almost always
implicate foreign relations, and federal common law should be
applied.200
Judge Reinhardt stated that, "there is a distinction
between substituting international law for federal common
law and making proper use of international law as a part of
federal common law."" 1 He argued that courts should refrain
from substituting international law principles for established
federal common law unless a statute mandates such
substitution. °2 When determining the choice of law to apply
to a case, Judge Reinhardt urged courts to consider the
factors set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws section six.203 He argued that these factors weighed in
195. Id.; Rivera, supra note 36, at 274.




200. See id. at 965 ("There are unique federal interests involved in Alien
Torts Claims Act cases that support the creation of a uniform body of federal
common law to facilitate the implementation of such claims.").
201. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 967 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
202. See id. at 966.
203. Id. at 967-68; see also THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS, supra note 148, § 6.
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favor of applying federal common law in ATS cases.2 °4 To
begin, "ease in the determination and application of the law
to be applied" is furthered by applying a well-developed body
of law, not a standard purported in an ad hoc tribunal
recently created.20 5 Additionally, "certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result" have a higher chance of being
obtained when a well-founded precedent upon which to rely
exists.20 6 Finally, "the basic polic[y] underlying the particular
field of law" is to provide appropriate tort remedies for
international law violations.20 7  Thus, Judge Reinhardt
argued that applying domestic common law was the
appropriate choice of law, according to the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.208
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has
also held that "the purpose of the ATS is 'to establish a
federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common
law remedies to give effect to violations of customary
international law.' "209 Furthermore, resolving the question of
when third-party liability arises is a basic legal matter that is
routinely determined by federal courts.210 The New York
district court's holding in the South Africa Apartheid cases
show additional judicial resistance to applying international
law to ATS claims.211  The court there stated that
international aiding and abetting standards are not
sufficiently "universal, definable, and obligatory" to be
recognizable under international law.212  Thus, the court
204. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 967-68.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 968.
208. See id. ("[Tihe application of third-party liability standards generally
applicable to tort cases directly furthers the basic policy of using tort law to
redress international wrongs, whereas the application of international criminal
law doctrines does not advance that objective .... [B]ecause Supreme Court
precedent concerning the application of federal common law dictates its
application here, and because the accepted choice of law factors overwhelmingly
militate in favor of applying federal common law, [the court should] derive a
third-party liability standard for ATS cases from that body of law.").
209. Id. at 966 n.4 (quoting Abebe-Jira v, Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir.
1996)).
210. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
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applied domestic tort law.213 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC recently held that "courts applying
the [ATS] draw on federal common law, and there are well-
settled theories of vicarious liability under federal common
law."214
In addition to the fact that not all jurists believe that
international standards of vicarious liability should be
applied, there are also legal scholars who criticize the Ninth
Circuit's application of international law in Unocal to
determine standards of liability in ATS cases.215  Such
scholars argue that courts attempting to follow Unocal and
applying international law beyond the ATS's grant of subject
matter jurisdiction "may find themselves undertaking the
unwieldy analysis of whether there is an international norm,
whether that norm has been violated, and whether the
violation is actionable in court."" 6 Extending the application
of international law beyond ATS's jurisdictional grant invites
judicial "creativity" in the many cases where international
law does not provide clear guidance.217  Critics of the
application of international law to determine third-party
liability fear that such utilization would lead to inconsistent
and unpredictable decisions.21 8
C. Domestic Law of the Nation Where the Violation Occurred
There is also an argument that courts should look to the
213. Id. at 554.
214. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en
banc granted 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007).
215. See Civil Procedure-Choice of Law-Ninth Circuit Uses International
Law to Decide Applicable Substantive Law Alien Tort Claims Act, supra note
113.
216. See id. at 1529.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 1529-30 ("[Elven assuming that a district court could reach a
definitive international law conclusion on each ancillary question arising in
litigation, such determinations would remain ultimately unpredictable. For
example, in Unocal, the majority relied principally on two international
criminal tribunal cases decided in 1998 and 2000, respectively. How could
Unocal, the Myanmar Military, or the plaintiff villagers have understood the
legal consequences of the alleged actions before 1998 if the source of the
majority's principle did not emerge until then? Since Unocal, plaintiffs have
begun to bring lawsuits against hundreds of corporations for actions that
occurred as far back as 1960. . . . Because courts in ATS cases apply the
international law in force at the time of decision, not at the time the action in
question occurred, this problem is likely to arise frequently.").
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law of the situs when determining applicable standards for
various forms of third-party liability.219 In Filartiga, the
court ruled that Paraguayan law was the appropriate source
to determine the standard for setting compensatory
damages. 220 However, since there were no punitive damages
recognized in Paraguayan law, the court also looked to
international law to determine the standard for those types of
damages to be awarded.221
V. PROPOSAL
When courts are faced with determining where to find
the applicable standard to apply to third-party liability in
ATS cases, courts should follow the international law
standard laid out by the majority in Unocal. U.S. domestic
courts should apply international law when it is sufficiently
established and well-defined. This would address the
complaints of those challenging the legitimacy of the district
courts that hold corporations liable under complicity
standards.222  International law should be utilized to
determine the standard of third-party liability, assuming
there is a universally recognized and clearly defined
standard. If there are no jus cogens norms or universally
recognized international standards for the alleged liability,
courts should be free to apply the law of the situs or U.S.
domestic law. Currently courts do not go through this type of
analysis, but simply differ by Circuit as to what standard
applies. This has the potential to lead to forum shopping to
pick a Circuit that applies standards more favorable to that
particular case. Courts should instead focus on the defendant
and adopt the most established standard available to ensure
full notice, due process, and fundamental fairness. This
would result in something similar to that proposed by the
court in Tachoina v. Mugabe,223 which advocated a case-by-
case approach, making use of "federal common law, the forum
state, the foreign jurisdiction most affected, international law
or a combination of these sources."224
219. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
220. Id. at 865.
221. Id.
222. See Maassarani, supra note 7, at 46.
223. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
224. Id. at 411.
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Applying an international standard is the most efficient
and fair way to ensure full notice to the defendant engaging
in violations of the law of nations. It is presumed that an
individual or corporation will be on notice that they will be
held liable to standards with truly universal recognition. In
doing this, U.S. courts are holding individuals or corporations
liable for a violation of an international norm that was
committed in a foreign state. Since the act was not
committed in U.S. territory, the defendant is more likely to
believe that he is held to standards universally recognized by
the international community, not the intricacies of U.S.
domestic law.
If the courts apply a standard of liability that is followed
in customary international law, they have a greater likelihood
of satisfying the maxim nulilum crimen sine lege.225 The basis
of this maxim is that "criminal law ought to be certain, so
that people can know in advance whether the conduct on
which they are about to embark is criminal or not.'22 6 It
would be unfair to hold an individual actor or corporation
liable for actions if it was not on notice that such action could
lead to a type of third-party liability. Additionally, requiring
private actors to be knowledgeable of all the particulars of
United States federal standards of tortious third-party
liability seems unduly burdensome when there are customary
international law standards of liability of which the whole
world is presumably on notice. Thus, based simply on the
principles of fairness and notice, international standards
should apply where appropriate.
Furthermore, the use of international standards of
liability will help to strengthen the international community.
As part of the international community, the United States
should apply, when appropriate, standards set forth and
recognized internationally. Applying such standards, if they
truly meet the requirements of customary international law,
would not conflict with U.S. domestic jurisdiction. In fact,
"[w]hen an international legal principle achieves sufficient
international acceptance that it constitutes customary
international law, it also becomes part of the federal common
225. BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW




law."227 Furthermore, "[a]ll international legal principles do
not automatically become a part of the federal common law;
only those that achieve the status of customary international
law or are included in international treaties are incorporated
as part of federal common law."22 A customary law "results
from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation."22 9 The necessary check
is in place so that international claims do not conflict with
domestic jurisdiction.
Applying international standards of liability also
arguably makes the ATS itself more legitimate. Since the
statute is international in nature, it makes sense to utilize
international norms, where applicable, throughout the
litigation process. This would seem to aid in the consistency
and efficiency of the whole process of litigating ATS claims.
For the reasons stated above, international law should be
followed when applying standards of third-party liability in
ATS litigation.
However, a universal and clearly defined international
standard will not exist for all sources of liability. Thus,
courts should apply either domestic law or the law of the situs
to determine the applicable standards by which the courts are
able to hold parties liable for violations of international law.
Defendants should not escape liability simply because no
form of vicarious liability is well defined in the international
community when a standard of liability is defined and
applicable in either the state where the violation occurred or
in U.S. domestic law. If the violations occurred in a state
with a clearly developed and operative legal system, where
the actor charged with violating the law of nations was
presumably on notice that his actions may give rise to
liability, the law of the situs should be applied. This
rationale is justified by the notice issue that could potentially
rise throughout the course of litigation, as the actor is
presumed to be on notice of the laws that apply to his or her
behavior in the country he or she is located. Therefore,
applying the law of situs could eliminate any lack of notice
227. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
228. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 969 (9th Cir. 2002); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1986).
229. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 969; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 228, § 102.
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defense potentially available to the defendant.
The problem with only applying the law of the situs is
that most violations of the law of nations occur in developing
nations that do not have a strong, operative legal system.
Therefore, if there is not a universal, well-defined
international law or clearly developed law of situs that U.S.
courts could effectively apply, U.S. domestic courts should
freely apply U.S. domestic law to determine the standard of
third-party liability. The defendants should only be hailed
into U.S. courts if such courts have personal jurisdiction over
them. A corporation may subject itself to personal
jurisdiction in federal courts of the United States by
purposefully availing itself through minimum contacts with
the forum state, which are continuous and systematic, or
highly related to the cause of action.2 30 By putting themselves
in a position where a court has personal jurisdiction over
them, the defendants presumably would have the reasonable
expectation of accountability to U.S. laws. Therefore, they
would be on notice of the different standards of liability for
which they could be charged. This reasoning is especially
persuasive when American corporations are being named as
defendants. These corporations will certainly be on notice of
the standards of liability applicable for violations of U.S. law.
The proposed approach satisfies all of the required
elements to establish an ATS claim. Since the threshold
violation must be a violation of international law, the
international aspect of the tort is covered. The claims are
brought in United States domestic courts, and therefore,
determining liability is sufficiently addressed by the
standards laid out in U.S. domestic courts. There is the
potential for inconsistency if U.S. courts are required to apply
standards set out in international tribunals or by
international legal scholars that is not universally accepted or
defined clearly. Applying U.S. domestic law is acceptable
because U.S. courts are knowledgeable in applying their own
standards of liability. Furthermore, the United States is
contributing to the international protection of human rights
by providing a venue for victims seeking justice against the
230. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
(establishing the purposefully availed standard); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) (establishing the minimum contacts standard).
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individual perpetrators of the violations. The courts should
be able to apply their own well-defined standards of liability
to cases brought under their jurisdiction when there is no
other universally accepted standard to apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although practically unused for almost 200 years, the
ATS has become a powerful tool for U.S. courts to hold actors
liable for their participation in committing international
violations of human rights. It has been used to hold state
officials, private actors, and corporations liable for their
contribution to violations of the law of nations.231 For every
ATS claim, the plaintiff~s) must assert a violation of an
international norm that is universally recognized and defined
with specificity. This was the standard set out by the
Supreme Court in Sosa, the Court's most recent decision
interpreting the ATS.232 If a corporation or private actor is
being sued through third-party liability, courts must
determine first whether state action is required for the tort
alleged, and second, what standard of third-party liability
applies.2 33  Based on the requirement of notice and the
notions of fairness and efficiency, courts should utilize
internationally established standards of third-party liability,
assuming such a standard exists for the type of liability being
alleged (i.e. complicity) with universal recognition and a clear
definition.234 If no international standard exists, then U.S.
courts can and should apply U.S. domestic standards of
liability or the law of the situs to hold corporations and
individual actors liable for their contributions to international
human rights violations.23" 5
231. See supra Part II.A-B.
232. See supra Part II.C.
233. See supra Part III.
234. See supra Part V.
235. See supra Part V.
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